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The Supreme Court of the United States is a peculiar
institution. It is peculiar in two senses: it is peculiar in
the sense that it is unique; it is peculiar, too, in the sense
that it is strange.
I think we are usually aware that the Supreme Court
is both strange and unique. What we tend to forget is
that it is an institution. As a people, we generally ignore
the institutional aspects of our government. And many
of our present ills derive from this failure to comprehend
that government institutions - like other institutions of
our society - are both more than and different from the
men who happen, at any given time, to occupy office. If
the consequences of this failure are not immediately
discernible, they are nonetheless grave. Indeed, I respectfully submit, it is this failure of perception that may
very well prove fatal to the basic American concept of
democratic government.
When this nation was born, the Constitution served
the function of assigning different powers to different
branches of government. It was recognized by the
Founding Fathers, if not by their successors, that power
is corrupting of the individuals who exercise it and
dangerous to the people on whose behalf those powers
are theoretically exercised. The Constitution, therefore,
divided power, not only between the nation and the
states in that unique scheme that was American federalism, but within the national government among three
branches. The constitutionally commanded separation of
powers and system of checks and balances were thought
necessary to the preservation of individual freedom.
It is, in part, the rejection of these checks and
balances and separation of powers that has resulted in
the inordinate loss of individual freedom from which we
suffer today and which is likely to be exacerbated
tomorrow. For we are already living in an era in which
the individual has been subordinated to a whole group of
corporate elements in our society, not least of which is
government itself.
One need spend very little time in Washington, D.C.,
to recognize that, for the most part, government exists
for its own sake and not for the benefit of the people to
whom it should be responsible. Nor is the statehouse or
city hall any different on this score. It was this condition
that John Adams sought to prevent when he advocated a
government of laws and not of men.
Instead of a division of function between local and
national government, we have witnessed, over the last
century, a steady accumulation of national power with a
concomitant reduction in local authority. Certainly, this
is due to a multitude of causes. In many ways it is the
natural result of our technological progress that has
reduced space and time through better - or at least
quicker - means of transportation and communication;
that has, indeed, made one society out of many. In no
small measure, however, it is also a consequence of an
unwillingness on the part of local government to assume
its obligations and responsibilities.
And this has been matched by a grasp for power by
the central government that was made to exceed even
the bureaucratic reach. When the lawyers for the rich
warned us of the dangers inherent in the national income
tax, we tended to deride them for special pleading. But
it is the national income tax that has made the states
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dependent on the charity of the national government,
charity which in its latest form is labeled "revenue
sharing." Charity may be the greatest of individual
virtues; it is the most stifling of governmental powers.
Just as the states have become moribund as agencies
of government, destroying the safeguards that federalism
was intended to secure, so too have we seen the
deterioration of separation of powers in the national
sphere. Here again, the centralization of power in the
executive branch is in some measure due to the
inordinate growth of government that has made it
impossible for Congress adequately to oversee the
functions of that government. In part, it is due to the
failure of Congress to perform the tasks assigned to it,
because it was easier to let someone else do it. In part, it
is due to the desire and demand for power - some may
call it usurpation - by the executive branch itself.
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as i~t
may be

too
late
to restore
the
Presidency
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THE PERSONALITY APPROACH
Meanwhile, the American people have tended to
measure the desirability of the result of this deterioration of representative government in terms of their
personal predilections for the occupants of the Presidential office. When it is a President with what has come to
be called "charisma," a Franklin Delano Roosevelt or a
John Fitzgerald Kennedy, some of us have applauded
the seizure of power by the President. When that office
is occupied by one whose objectives are less to our
tastes, we deplore the power that has become his to
exercise.
We have not been willing to understand that when we
approve the transfer of power from Congress to the
President because we tend to trust and admire the
recipient of that authority, we are assuring that his
successor, too, whoever he might be, will be able to
assert the same authority, even if he uses it to different
ends. As Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson once
observed: "Evil men are rarely given power; they take it
over from better men to whom it had been entrusted."
(Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 160.)
It is essentially since the regime of Franklin Roosevelt
that this country has become the subject of Presidential
government, so clearly distinguished from Congressional
government, as described by Woodrow Wilson many
decades ago.
But it is also true that the powers that were exerted
by Franklin Roosevelt were puny, as compared with
those which have been exercised by his successors in
office. For we have arrived at the stage where the
President asserts - without meaningful challenge- powers and privileges that once were those of
the legislature, even to the point of assuming the power
over the appropriations process, which was thought to be
the primary safeguard of democratic government.
(It may be recalled that it was Parliament's successful
assertion of the power over the purse that moved
England from an autocratic monarchy to a democratic
polity.)
The new Presidency has ridden over even the authority of the old-line executive departments. These executive departments have been reduced to menial status. All
policy is made and largely effected by what is benignly

HeinOnline -- 2 Student Law. 18 1973-1974

known as "the White House staff," a staff that once
could be more than amply housed in a single wing of the
White House, but which now sprawls through buildings
that once contained the entire Department of State and
several other old-line departments as well.
And, without a semblance of substantial concern by
the people or their elected representatives, the President
now proposes to reorganize the national government to
reduce further the power of these departments by
consolidating them in a way that affords greater and
greater White House control. Yes, that reorganization
may make for more efficiency, although I doubt it. But
as Mr. Justice Douglas once noted: "All executive
power from the reign of ancient kings to the rule of
modern dictators has the outward appearance of
efficiency." (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 629.)
It may be that the problem of the ever-expanding
executive power has come closer to American consciousness in recent years as Presidents - and I am certainly
speaking of more than one have undertaken to engage
this country in foreign wars without Congressional
authority, as Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy did; to
impose economic controls by fiat, as Kennedy and
Nixon have done; to determine which Congressional
programs they will effectuate and which they will ignore,
as Truman, Kennedy, and Nixon have done; and to do all
these things behind a cloak of secrecy that cannot be
penetrated, even by the elected representatives of the
people - as certainly all of them have done.
And all of this has been justified by invoking
precedents, precedents to which the American people
took no exception because the leaders who indulged in
this abuse of power were trusted by them to bring about
the right ends, even if by the wrong means.
It was Mr. Justice Frankfurter who reminded us,
when the Court stopped the exertion of executive
authority in the case of the seizure of the steel mills by
the President: "The accretion of dangerous power does
not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from
the generative force of unchecked disregard of the
restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested
assertion of authority." (Youngstown Sbeet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594.)
I have dwelled on the Presidency and the violation of
its institutional limits because they are easily discerned
and, today at least, readily acknowledged. Senators who
acquiesced for years in Presidential aggrandizement are
suddenly vocally cognizant of the dangers. It remains to
be seen whether Congress has the backbone to indulge
more than empty words to reestablish its constitutional
authority. (Despite "Watergate," the House continues to
be the tail to the presidential kite.)
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIFE TENURE
As with the White House, so, too, with the Supreme
Court. During the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, there
were many who could find no fault with the constantly
expanding power of the judiciary. For surely it was
directed to ends of which they approved. Now that the
personnel of the Court has changed, and with that

change has come a change in the apparent values of the
justices, these same people who once so loudly acclaimed the assertion of judicial authority are now
concerned to assure that the judiciary be kept in its
sphere. The lesson of the Sorcerer's Apprentice must be
learned once again.
Just as it may be too late to restore the Presidency to
its proper dimensions, so it may be impossible to confine
the Court. Despite the plentiful rhetoric, the question is
no longer whether we should have an activist Court. An
activist Court is one that assumes capacities to govern in
broader and broader areas. An activist Court is one that
interferes with legislative and executive judgements on the
basis of its own contrary personal predilections.
But such a Court may have either a conservative or
liberal bias. It will remain an activist Court even if its
clientele changes from the laborer, the black, and the
economically deprived, to big business, big labor, and big
government. The Nine Old Men whom Roosevelt sought
to displace were no less an activist Court than the
Warren Court, whose justices President Nixon has - almost as successfully so far - sought to replace.
The Burger Court with its inheritance of authority is
not likely to prove less activist, but only less liberal. And
those who scorned the idea of institutional limitations - constitutional limitations if you will - are suddenly taken with the importance of those limitations.
Too late.
There are, however, several differences between the
judicial and executive branches of the national government that are relevant here. The first is that the judicial
branch has no direct responsibility to the people. Where
the President must be chosen every four years representatives every two and each senator every six - the
judicial appointees remain in office for life. A new
Court, unlike a new administration or a new Congress, is
a fortuitous event. And, contrary to public opinion, a
new Court does not derive from the appointment of a
new chief justice. For the other justices are not
subordinate to the chief justice. The chief justice has no
lawmaking authority that is greater than that of his
judicial brethren.
Indeed, a new Court, in the sense of a new jurisprudence, need not even be brought about by a change of a
majority of the personnel and, on the other hand, may
be brought about even where the personnel does not
change at all. I would submit as examples the fact that
the Roosevelt Court came into existence, in the sense of
the end of the era of "substantive due process," when
Justices Hughes and Roberts became firmly attached to
the theretofore dissenting trio of Brandeis, Stone and
Cardozo, even before any Roosevelt appointee joined it.
Again, the Warren Court did not come into existence
in 1954, when Warren was appointed and the
school desegregation cases were decided. (The school
cases would have been decided the way they were had
Vinson survived to preside over that term of Court.) The
Warren Court a Court with its own patent judicial
philosophy - did not come into existence really until
the decision in a case called Mapp v. Ohio made it clear
that the Court was prepared to impose on the states its
own expansive notions of a code of criminal procedure,
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and the decision in Baker v. Carr, which made it clear
that the Court was prepared to prescribe the proper
form of government for the states.
And it was called the Warren Court because Warren
was its chairman, not because Warren was its leader. The
doctrines of the Warren Court had been formulated by
Justices Black and Douglas long before the advent of
Warren, and those two justices remained the Warren
Court's doctrinal leaders throughout its life.
There is, moreover, one difference of no small
importance between the accretion of power in the
judiciary and that which has occurred in the executive
branch. The judiciary is inherently a governmental
weakling. Its power is dependent upon acquiescence in
its orders by the other branches of government. Thus,
the school segregation decisions were meaningless words
so long as President Eisenhower and the Congress
refused the approval and cooperation of their powers
that could make the decisions meaningful.
Indeed, much of the Court's alleged successes in
recent years have been verbal rather than real, with the
result that it has been given both credit and blame which
do not properly belong to it.
For example, if we examine the three areas in which
the Court established its reputation for doing good
during the Warren regime, we discover something less
than glorious achievement. One needn't live in Chicago,
under the shadow of yesterday's headlines, to know that
separation of the races, in and out of school, remains despite the Court's decision - the dominant problem of
American society.
It is clear that the state legislatures have been
reapportioned in accordance with the commands of the
federal courts, commands frequently issued by divided
federal three-judge courts, divided according to the
political party allegiance of each of the judges. Even so,
the shift of seats in the legislatures has been from a
conservative farm constituency to a more conservative
suburban constituency.
The plight of urban America is no more the direct
concern of the new legislatures than it was of the old
ones. The cure has been of a symptom rather than a
disease. For even under the "new equality ' of the
Warren Court, the power of gerrymander has remained
undisturbed. Corporate, i.e., group, interests as distinguished from individual interests are well served under
the new allocation, as they were under the old one.
When we come to that area of constitutional law
which has aroused perhaps the greatest political furor,
the Supreme Court's decisions in the area of criminal
justice, we again see little change wrought by the Court's
judgments. Surely the Court is not to blame for the
crime wave that inundates the country. Certainly, as a
result of the Court's decisions, there are criminals on the
loose who might otherwise have been punished.
But it is ludicrous to suggest that the overabundance
of criminals that we have with us are charting their
courses by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Law is
probably the last thing in the minds of those who have
made the FBI crime statistics look like our national
debt, climbing at an even more rapid rate.
On the other hand, when it is noted that the function
of the Court's rulings was not to free the guilty but to

HeinOnline -- 2 Student Law. 20 1973-1974

chastise the police and the prosecutor so that they
would not engage in police-state tactics against the
innocent citizen, it must be recognized that the Supreme
Court's decisions seem to have brought about no noticeable improvement in police behavior, either. Mr. Justice
Holmes' dictum is as applicable to the Warren Court's
activities as to that of all its predecessors. Courts are capable of bringing about only molecular, and not molar,
changes in our society.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the Court's
behavior is not unimportant. If it affirms basic ethical
concepts, which may be as old as the Decalog or the
glories of Greece or Rome, it provides a strong moral
force for good, but by way of example rather than
precept. And, then, none knows better than those now
living that molecular changes, too, can be of no small
consequence when enough molecules are rearranged to
form new patterns or destroy old ones.
That the new Court the Burger Court - is different
from the old one - the Warren Court - is easily acknowledged, and yet prediction of what results that difference
is going to bring about would be foolhardy. One could
hardly have anticipated that the Burger Court would
have been the one to decide that the death penalty as it
has been applied is unconstitutional. The Warren Court
had that question before it again and again. Never did it
face up to the question and hold, as the Burger Court
did last term, that the death penalty violated the "cruel
or unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment.
And yet every member of the five-man majority in
that case was a holdover from the Warren Court, and
every dissenting member of the Court in that case was a
Nixon appointee.
And it was the Burger Court that, earlier last year,
struck down state laws banning abortions, a result repeatedly sought from and repeatedly denied by the
Warren Court. It cannot be said that precedent or
personal predilection was an adequate basis for predicting the outcome of the capital punishment cases or the
abortion cases.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE COURT
On the other hand, we have already seen that
the Burger Court has drawn back from an extension
of the Warren Court's decisions in the area of criminal
procedure. The infamous Miranda rule that prevented
convictions for police failure to instruct the accused of
his right to silence and to counsel has not been
overruled, but stopped in its tracks - tracks made, until
the advent of the Burger Court, by seven-league boots.
The sanctification of the jury trial by the Warren
Court has been reversed by the Burger Court, in the
latter's holdings that less than 12 persons can properly
constitute a jury - even in the federal courts - and, indeed, that a less than unanimous verdict satisfies the demands of the Constitution.
If pornography has received less protection from the
Burger Court than it did from the Warren Court
although it should be remembered that Chief Justice
Warren himself was not often to be found on the side of
the First Amendment against the claims for suppression

Professor Philip B. Kurland, University of Chicago Law
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of obscenity - it might be noted that it was the Burger
Court that ruled in favor of the right of the New York
Times to publish classified data purloined from the
secret files of the Defense Department.
The Court is a complex mechanism. Those who
would paint it with a broad brush and in a single color
cannot be true to the subject or to the viewer for whose
benefit the image is created. The perspective of time will
reveal the new Court's dominant characteristics. They
have not yet emerged.
Comparisons, moreover, are difficult if not impossible. The new Court will be facing new problems arising
in new contexts. We live in a volatile society and the law even as pronounced by the most powerful judicial
tribunal in the world - remains essentially a response to
the demands of its society rather than a formulator of
that society.
In some ways, the new Court will be faced with
harder questions than its predecessor was prepared to
meet. I have already made reference to the capital
punishment cases. Let me offer one more example. The
Warren Court chose not to answer the question whether
non-Southern states, too, have obligations to desegregate
their schools. But the Burger Court has, in the
Denver case, held applicable to the North, East, and
West, the rules that the Warren Court would apply only
to the South.
Then, too, the Burger Court will have important new
facts to assay in reaching its conclusions about the
continued validity of earlier decisions. Just to stick to
the school desegregation question for the moment, it
should be noted that Brown v. Board of Education
rested on the proposition that equality of educational
opportunity was dependent on desegregation of the
schools. Recent scientific - or quasi-scientific - data
have undermined that premise. Work culminating in the
Coleman Report, the Moynihan and Mosteller book, the
study by David Armour, and the recent book by
Christopher Jencks, seems to suggest that it is not the
educational process that creates the differences in
educational achievement of blacks and whites.
How should the Court utilize the new data which
contradict the social science evidence on which the
Court purported to rely in Brown? Surely it is not going
to reverse Brown. But how is it going to accommodate
the law to the facts?
So, too, we have evidence that the Miranda rule has
brought about none of the results that were anticipated.
Whether or not the fourfold warning is delivered to an
accused, he seems to behave in the same way, and so,
too, do his prosecutors. These facts confound the condemners of the Miranda decision no less than its
defenders. But what is the Court to do about it? The
(continued on page 44)
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Miranda decision, like the Brown case, is more important
now as a symbol than as a reality.
Not only is the experiential base on which the
Burger Court operates different from that of its predecessor; so too, of necessity is its legal base. Its
inheritance is different from that of the Warren Court.
One of the major determinants of the new Court's
behavior will be its attitude toward precedents, including
the precedents of the Warren Court. And the question
will be whether the Burger Court will do as the Warren
Court did or as the Warren Court said. For surely, no
Court ever treated precedents more cavalierly than did
the Warren Court. A similar attitude on the part of the
Burger Court could soon doom all the judgments of
recent years. And, as might be expected, the new Court
has already followed example rather than precept. If it
has not overruled precedents, it has distinguished them in
such a way as to leave them all but dead.
Members of the Warren Court asserted that no
judgment was binding on them in which they did not
personally participate. Such a rule would mean that
precedents of the Warren Court would remain extant
only until the President makes one more appointment to
the high court bench.
Still another question about the new Court, yet to be
answered, is how the justices themselves will regard the
Court's proper role. I do not refer here to the sterile
concept of strict construction, but rather to which
groups will be selected by the Court as its clientele, its
wards, its constituency, however you wish to phrase it.
History has revealed that the rhetoric of judicial
opinions has remained fairly consistent, however disparate the results. The banners of freedom and equality
have been raised by the Court over very different contending forces. It was freedom-freedom of contractthat grounded the actions of the followers of Mr. Justice
Field in affording protection to commercial and industrial interests against the onslaught of government regulation. It was the notion of equality that so long
doomed the labor unions to government by injunction.
The answer to the question of who will be the
beneficiary of the new Court's benevolence remains in
the womb of time. Thus far the Burger Court seems to
have taken only "women's lib" under its protective
wing.
One more factor in the fashioning of the Burger
Court will be the action or inaction of other
branches of the American government. It surely must be
conceded that, in no small measure, the original impetus
for the Warren Court's jurisprudence came from the
failure of the national and state governments to address
meaningfully the myriad problems deriving from the racial
discrimination that plagued the nation; from the failure
of the state legislatures to abide the commands of their
own constitutions to apportion their legislatures democratically; from the failure of the states to provide
against the abuses of the criminal laws, even after these
abuses had been pointed out to them by the Supreme

Court. If the other branches of government undertake to
perform their functions and attempt to resolve the
societal problems that sicken the nation, there may be
no reason for the judicial branch to intervene at all;
certainly there will be less compulsion to do so.
Allow me- a few minutes more to speak of the Burger
Court's attitude toward state power and authority. First,
however, I would make it clear that the one constant
factor in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, from Chief
Justice Marshall's day to this one, has been its persistent
contribution to the movement of power from the states
to the nation.
In this regard the United States Supreme Court has
not been unique. Historians have shown that it was the
national judiciaries that provided the avenue for the
transfer of power from the barons to the crown in
medieval Europe. This too was the lesson of Westminster
in English history. And the role of the national judiciary
in this country has been the same, as Jefferson saw at
the outset of his controversy with Marshall and
Marshall's Supreme Court. There is no reason to suspect
that there will be a reversal of this general position by
the Burger Court. Some cases, however, such as the
recent pornography decisions and criminal law cases,
speak of the return of authority to local goverment.
THE RESURGENCE OF DUE PROCESS
There are two basic means for the Supreme Court
and the other courts of the federal judicial system to invalidate state statutes and to reverse or overrule state
judicial decisions: the equal protection clause and the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

44

Evidence is that the former will prove less expansive
under the Burger Court than it was under the Warren
Court. Equality will no longer be the primary slogan to
justify constitutional decisions.
On the other hand, due process - minimal standards
of decency as distinguished from equal standards of
decency - may well see a resurgence.
We have already witnessed some decisions that give
rise to this anticipation. But, before I build your hopes
too high, it should be made clear that there is not likely
to be a judicial revolution on this score. Equality for
women will be a developing area, both under the
existent statutory provisions and under the demands of
the equal protection clause - and more so if the vagaries
of the equal rights amendment become binding on the
Court. Problems of desegregation will continue to
receive friendly attention, although it is likely that the
school desegregation cases have reached the end of the
road. The NAACP desire to "metropolitanize" school
systems to incorporate suburbs and cities is not likely to
succeed, although desegregation among school systems
throughout the country will, sooner or later, be brought
about. And the classical demands for equality in such
matters as jury selection are not likely to be stayed.
So, too, it would seem that the reapportionment
cases will not be expanded to meet the remaining
essential problem of gerrymandering, with the exception
of those cases that fall afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment's ban on the inhibition of the franchise for blacks as
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revealed in the Tuskegee case, lo these many years ago
now. Indeed, the requirements of the simplistic "oneman, one-vote" rule have been substantially limited in
the most recent term.
The equality cases do show that the Court is no
longer reaching out to establish doctrines of substantive
equal protection. This may be seen in last term's
decision in the Moose Lodge case that permitted a
private club to discriminate despite the liquor monopoly
conferred by the state. And we have the refusal of the
Court to find discrimination violative of the Constitution in Texas's allocation of welfare payments in such
a fashion that the category with the highest proportion of blacks and Mexicans received the highest
proportional cut in benefits. But it must be said, in all
fairness, that the Burger Court has not been -niggling in its
readings of federal statutes commanding equality of
treatment.
Due process requirements, on the other hand, have
seen less substantial limitations from the Burger Court.
It is true that there have been several major cases in
which the Burger Court refused to damn judgments
that would surely have fallen during the heyday of the
Warren Court. The refusal to extend the Miranda rule
to exclude evidence used solely for impeachment purposes is typical of these.
There is a burgeoning area of Supreme Court substantive constitutional law to be found under the rubric
of the "right to travel." My own analysis is that this
foreshadows a development of the third major provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the privileges or immunities clause, from which the notion of the right to travel
originally derived. The right to welfare benefits and the
right to a ballot, both without residency requirement,
have already been established under this new doctrine. It
is in defining the privileges or immunities clause that I
expect the Burger Court to make its major impression on
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states.
I venture only one prediction about the Burger Court
here. For prediction is a function of scientists and fools
and I know I am not a scientist.

the Warren Court as the epitome of evil, largely because
it rejected their own prejudices, the Burger Court will be
regarded as an improvement.
For those of us who consider ourselves somewhere in
between these extremes - as we all do - it is necessary to
remember that the Supreme Court is not the government
of the United States, but only a part of it. Its primary
function remains, in part because its capacities will allow
it no more, to restrain the misbehavior of other
governmental bodies. It is overburdened with problems
that should better be left outside its ken: some too large,
others too small to call on the limited resources that the
Court can bring to bear.
This is not to demean the Court's role, but to
preserve it. It remains the one governmental institutionk
above all others capable of affording some protection,
however temporary, to individuals and minorities against
the incursion of majorities.
The primary defect of the Burger Court so far
revealed is the same defect that was observed in the
Warren Court. It has failed to account properly for its
judgments. It has issued decrees but it has not afforded
adequate rationales for them; it has attempted to rule by
fiat rather than reason.
Perhaps the Warren Court was the right Court for the
Age of Aquarius, that period of purple passions when
reason was subordinated to emotion and righteousness
was overcome by self-righteousness.
The Age of Aquarius is dead. Its funeral was held
on November 7, 1972. What the proper appellation will
be for the age that is dawning, we do not know.
The Court may be the quiet voice of reason that
inhibits a populism that is the opposite of Aquarianism
and yet is the same, just as facism and communism are
identical opposites. It may be the handmaiden of an
executive power that is destructive of individual freedom. It could be an ally of a legislative resurgence that
may yet make democratic government meaningful without destroying minority rights. The new Supreme
Court has not yet taken shape.
I would close with a quotation from G. K.
Chesterton's Ballad of the White Horse:

I predict that those who blindly worshipped the
Warren Court as the epitome of good, largely because it
reflected their own prejudices, will find the Burger Court
an abomination. For those who, equally blindly, despised

(continuedfrom page 11)
periods of remission when no new conviction occurs, as
well as being charged with the "relapses" of offenders
when new convictions do occur.
In any event, the least ideal setting for the achievement of any notion of rehabilitation is an isolated
setting of punitive confinement wherein are housed
mainly unmotivated persons whose principal concern is
to get out as soon as possible and return to their home
communities. It is a grossly incomplete statement to say,
as some have claimed, that prison is a microcosm of
society. The fact is that prison is the retributive and

I TELL YOU NA UGHT FOR YOUR COMFORT,
YEA, NOUGHT FOR YOUR DESIRE,
SAVE THAT THE SKY GROWS DARKER YET,
AND THE SEA RISES HIGHER.
incapacitative underpinning necessary to sustain the
enforcement of society's criminal laws. However, when a
just judicial determination is made that a convicted
offender be sentenced to prison, that person should find
himself imprisoned in a humane setting with a "rehabilitative climate." To speak of a "rehabilitative climate" is
not to impose upon the prisons the responsibility of
rehabilitation as such. It is to contend that it suffices to
provide modest program inputs during the short prison
portion of a sentence, i.e., program components which
can be said to be normally conducive to human
development and well-being. This would include but
obviously not be limited to: providing counseling and
group discussion, promoting literacy and language
training, providing library materials, offering adequate
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